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The CPS, Policy-Making and Assisted Dying: Towards a 
‘Freedom’ Approach 
Andrew Sanders* 
 
In 2016 I evaluated the CPS after its first 30 years of existence.1 I did this through the lens of 
the ‘freedom model’.2 This approach acknowledges that most people agree over the principal 
aims and values of criminal justice, at least at the level of rhetoric. Few people would argue 
against convicting the guilty, protecting the innocent, protecting everyone from arbitrary and 
oppressive treatment, treating victims with respect, and pursuing all this efficiently and 
proportionately. 
The problem is that these values and interests often clash. The goals are not 
controversial, but their prioritisation often is. ‘Freedom’ can be a kind of common currency 
that allows us to weigh up, in any situation, how to prioritise. Criminal justice practices reduce 
the freedom of suspects, but some reduce it more than others. Compare, for example, out-of 
court disposals by the CPS with prosecutions: the former usually reduce freedom less than the 
latter. And some crimes – eg sexual offences - erode more freedom for victims and society at 
large than do others – eg driving offences. Convicting guilty careless drivers, then, while 
desirable, should not be as high a priority as convicting sexual offenders. It will be evident 
from these examples that current law and practice sometimes prioritise ‘freedom’, but 
frequently do not. 
In an attempt to see what the ‘freedom’ model would look like concretely, I examined 
how far the CPS operationalised the three core criminal justice values that are integral to it: 
‘Justice’, ‘Democracy’ and the ‘Three Es’ (efficiency, effectiveness and economy). Again, 
these are not controversial in themselves, but prioritisation between and within them is.3 I 
looked at how a range of policies and powers were formulated, interpreted and exercised. I 
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concluded that CPS performance was improving, but still seriously deficient across all its work 
in relation to all three core values. This is due to its organisational culture, implicit and explicit 
policy choices, and structural position of police-dependence. One of the issues I examined 
briefly was assisted voluntary dying (AVD). Since space did not permit an extended treatment 
of this topic, this paper takes that opportunity.4 For my purposes AVD refers to assisted suicide 
(AS) and voluntary euthanasia (VE). We shall see that the CPS policy on AVD can be 
improved, but it will always fail the tests on ‘Justice’ and the ‘3 Es’. First we look at the policy 
on AVD, then at how it operationalises the three core values in turn, and then we will examine 
what would be needed to operationalise the ‘freedom’ model. 
 
I.  The CPS Assisted Dying Policy 
 
a) Assisted Suicide 
In Purdy,5 the applicant was suffering from MS. She wanted the CPS to promise that if her 
husband helped her to die when she asked him at some point in the future, he would not be 
prosecuted. The CPS refused, arguing that the Code for Crown Prosecutors gave guidance on 
this. Mrs Purdy correctly observed that the Code gave no indication of what would be likely to 
happen, for the ‘public interest’ factors are unprioritised. Which factor would be most 
important: the wishes of the ‘victim’ (Mrs Purdy) or the seriousness of the offence? If the latter, 
how seriously would assisted suicide be regarded? To counter this, by illustrating how it 
interpreted the Code in such cases, the CPS website summarised the case of Daniel James.6 
This young man had been confined to a wheelchair following a sporting accident. His suicide 
was assisted by his parents, despite their initial reluctance, after he spent several years trying 
to adjust to his difficult circumstances. His parents were not prosecuted because they were 
motivated solely by compassion and Daniel had a voluntary, informed, clear and settled wish 
to die.  
But one case does not make a policy. There was nothing in the Code to lead anyone to 
believe that the CPS would decide the Daniel James case in the way it did. There was no 
guarantee that the CPS, under a different DPP perhaps, would continue to decide cases like this 
in the same way in the future. So the House of Lords, as it then was, agreed with Mrs Purdy, 
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ordering the DPP to issue guidelines setting out how this discretion would be used. He was 
asked to formulate a policy that would take account of a defendant’s ‘improper motive’7 but 
that would also seek to ‘protect the right to make an autonomous choice’.8  The DPP speedily 
issued interim guidelines, based on existing practice9 as illustrated by the Daniel James case. 
There was a brief consultation after which the final version was published.10 
The main elements of the final version identify prosecution as more likely when: 
- the victim was under 18 years of age; 
- the victim had not reached, or was not capable of reaching, a voluntary, clear, settled and 
informed decision to commit suicide and/or was subject to pressure from D or others; 
- the victim had not clearly and unequivocally communicated his or her decision to commit 
suicide to the suspect; 
- the victim did not seek the assistance of the suspect personally or on his or her own 
initiative; 
- the suspect was not wholly motivated by compassion; 
- the suspect had a history of violence or abuse against the victim; 
- the victim was physically able to undertake the act that constituted the assistance him or 
herself; 
- the suspect was unknown to the victim and assisted the victim by providing specific 
information via, for example, a website or publication; 
- the suspect assisted more than one victim who were not known to each other; 
- the suspect was acting in his or her capacity as eg a medical doctor, nurse, other healthcare 
professional, a professional carer; 
- the actions of the suspect were of substantial assistance; 
- the suspect had not sought to dissuade the victim and/or did not act reluctantly. 
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We know from the fact that AS is rarely prosecuted (see Part IV below) that the guidelines 
pointing against prosecution are given great weight in practice. People are not prosecuted when 
they are judged (by police and CPS) to have helped people who express a voluntary, informed, 
clear and settled wish to die. The guidelines seek to discourage people from helping others to 
die when they have something to gain from the death. But whether this policy succeeds in both 
protecting the vulnerable and preserving the autonomy of those who wish to die is another 
matter. 
The DPP could have formulated a policy that simply said he would not prosecute if the 
‘victim’ had a voluntary, informed, clear and settled wish to die. Instead, the focus on the 
motivation and role of the perpetrator restricts assisted suicide more than Purdy required and 
in ways that do not relate to the decision’s interpretation of Art 8 ECHR (the protection of 
autonomous choices to die).11 The DPP’s policy attempts to compromise between ‘autonomy’ 
and ‘sanctity of human life’ positions. 
 
b) Voluntary Euthanasia 
The DPP could have included VE within the AVD policy, but chose not to do so. This may 
reflect the commonly held view that VE and AS are fundamentally different. Montgomery, for 
example, views the elements of the policy that stress the virtue of minimal assistance as positive 
as, in his view, ‘this maintains the distinction between suicide and homicide.’12 But 
Montgomery makes no distinction between voluntary and involuntary homicide. 
We can categorise people who seek VE as follows: 
a) those who are physically incapable of taking the final step; 
b) those who try and fail to take the final step themselves; 
c) those who do not wish to take the final step themselves. 
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on Assisted Suicide: The Policy for Prosecutors’ (2011) 31 Legal Studies 119). For a philosophical discussion 
focussing on the ‘compassion’ element see A Duff, ‘Criminal Responsibility and the Emotions: If Fear and Anger 
Can Exculpate, Why Not Compassion?’ Inquiry (2015) 58, 189. 
12 J Montgomery, ‘Guarding the gates of St Peter’ (2011) 31 Legal Studies 644 @ p661. 
But reality is messy. Each category could include those who would have been able to take the 
final step with assistance but did not because of the constraints of the AS laws (eg, fear that 
their assister(s) would be prosecuted or that they would not be successful), or who perhaps tried 
and were unsuccessful, and who waited until they were desperate to die but were no longer 
confident they could take the final step themselves. 
Nicklinson concerned a middle aged man with ‘locked-in’ syndrome following a 
devastating stroke.13 After trying to make a satisfying life for a considerable time with this 
condition he decided he no longer wished to live. He could make his wishes known clearly by 
using a computer linked to his eye movements, but this was the only movement of which he 
was capable. He was therefore in category (a). For such people there are currently just 3 
solutions: 
 
1. Travel to Dignitas in Switzerland, which is very difficult with the apparatus most people in 
category (a) need to live;  
2. Self-starvation;14 
3. Continuing to suffer, which for the appellants in Nicklinson was “undignified, distressing 
and intolerable.”15 
 
Despite this, the appellants (almost inevitably) failed in their claims. One argument concerned 
Art 8. But since the Art 8 arguments in relation to AS failed (because of the ‘margin of 
appreciation’ ie the leeway given by the ECHR to domestic jurisdictions to order their criminal 
justice systems as best fits domestic tradition and culture), the Court of Appeal considered that 
the same would have to be true of the more serious offence of  murder even when it takes the 
form of VE.16 
A more substantial argument was ‘necessity’, though as ‘necessity’ is excluded in cases 
of murder the appellants were necessarily going to struggle with this too. An analogy was 
drawn with the ‘conjoined twins’ case, which allowed doctors to separate twins knowing this 
would kill one of them.17 But the crucial difference between the two cases is that in the 
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‘conjoined twins’ case both would have died without intervention, while in Nicklinson all the 
appellants could live indefinitely. More fundamentally, if there is no defence of necessity for 
AS, how can there be one for the more serious offence of VE?18 And how could there be a 
defence of necessity for AS when section 2 of the Suicide Act criminalises it?19 Herring 
attempts to answer this as follows. If the person seeking VE cannot kill him/herself, that 
person’s Art 8 rights can only be realised by allowing a person of choice to kill him/her.20 
However, everyone, no matter how disabled, can kill themselves by starving themselves to 
death. This is precisely what Tony Nicklinson and others21 did. This gross inhumanity, 
comparable with torture (violation of Art 3), provides one reason for changing the law. But it 
is always an option. Herring might respond that it is ‘necessary’ to allow an option that does 
not violate Art 3. But exactly the same argument could apply for many people seeking 
assistance in suicide, as many of them, too, have no humane way to die except with the help of 
others. 
Whatever the precise arguments, it is clear that there will be no judicial development of 
a VE policy anytime soon, even for people in category (a). So the CPS policy on AS should 
logically include VE for people in Tony Nicklinson’s situation at the very least. But all the 
policy says is:  
 
If the course of conduct goes beyond encouraging or assisting suicide, for example, 
because the suspect goes on to take or attempt to take the life of the victim, the 
public interest factors tending in favour of or against prosecution may have to be 
evaluated differently in the light of the overall criminal conduct. [48] 
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Nicklinson’ (2013) Crim LR 949. 
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20 J Herring, ‘Escaping the shackles of law at the end of life: R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice’ Medical Law 
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by S Gardner, ‘Direct Action and the defence of necessity’ [2005] Crim LR 371. 
21 Such as Jean Davies, an 86-year-old who was suffering from several painful and distressing health problems: 
http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/oct/19/right-to-die-campaigner-starved-herself-jean-davies. Both she 
and Tony Nicklinson took 2+ weeks to die, though it seems that infections, brought on by their starved conditions, 
were the technical causes of death. 
Turning to category (b), Keating and Bridgeman give several examples.22 Vanessa Cook 
suffered from MS and depression and unsuccessfully tried three times to kill herself before 
taking an overdose and asking her husband not to call emergency services before she was dead. 
Her husband ensured she died by suffocating her. Sarah Lawson attempted suicide three times 
in the week before a final attempt was reinforced, again, by suffocation, this time by her father. 
The courts in these cases generally convict of manslaughter on grounds of diminished 
responsibility (not murder) and award non-custodial sentences, thus demonstrating the absence 
of doubt about the compassionate and consensual basis of the death. But why convict at all in 
that case? Moreover, not all defendants in these circumstances are so lucky: when Frank Lund 
ensured his serially-suicidal wife actually died, as she requested, he was convicted of murder 
and sentenced to ‘life’.23 In similar circumstances, George Webb smothered his extremely 
ailing wife when her suicide attempt (which he reluctantly assisted) was failing, as she had 
asked him to do. He pleaded guilty to manslaughter on the grounds of diminished 
responsibility. This man of 73, with psychiatric problems and suffering the double anguish of 
his wife’s death at his own hands, still served six months imprisonment before his sentence 
was reduced on appeal.24 So he was luckier than Frank Lund, but still suffered abominably at 
the hands of our justice system for carrying out a last act of love at the request of the ‘victim’.25 
 
It is clear that the CPS policy remains problematic. But to fully understand this, and before we 
can begin to plot a way forward, we need to review it using the ‘core values’ within the freedom 
approach. 
 
II.  First Core Value: Democracy 
 
A consultation process is only an exercise in democracy if consultee responses are taken into 
account in a principled way. This can only be done if the principles underlying the policy to be 
consulted on are articulated. No principles were articulated when the CPS consulted on its draft 
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25 Changes to the law on diminished responsibility (Coroners and Justice Act) now make this route to 
manslaughter less likely to be available in such cases: M Gibson, ‘Pragmatism Preserved? The Challenges of 
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policy. There is insufficient space to analyse the CPS response to all the issues raised in the 
consultation, but here are the most important examples.  
i) The interim policy included several suspect-oriented factors (eg, whether the suspect 
had an entirely compassionate, as compared to a financial or malicious, motive). A majority of 
respondents agreed with these factors, and they found their way into the final policy. But only 
a minority of respondents agreed with the victim-oriented mitigating factor that found its way 
into the final policy (that the ‘victim’ had a voluntary, informed, clear and settled wish to die). 
ii) The interim policy ‘weighted’ some factors as more important than others. Over 80% 
of respondents agreed with ‘weighting’ in relation to 7 of the 8 pro-prosecution factors (the 7 
that eventually found their way into the final policy). But the decision was taken not to continue 
this weighting into the final policy on the bizarre ground that not weighting ‘makes the final 
policy clearer and more accessible’ even though ‘the particular facts of the case may mean that 
one factor alone may outweigh a number of other factors which tend in the opposite 
direction.’26 This means that although the policy allows for one factor to be weighted more 
heavily than another, it is claimed that the policy will be clearer and more accessible if no 
indication is given of which factors will be so weighted, to what extent, and in what 
circumstances. But this is not self-evident. Nor is there any explanation of how clarity and 
accessibility were weighed against public approval. Would the same decision have been taken 
if 99% of respondents had approved of the weighting? 
iii) The consultation asked what other public interest factors might have been included 
in favour of, or against, prosecution. A few suggestions favouring prosecution were adopted in 
the final policy. But the suggestion that written documentation signifying a wish to die (such 
as a living will) be a factor against prosecution was rejected. This was on the ground that it was 
not for the CPS to recognise such a step if Parliament did not. Yet this whole policy takes a 
step away from a clear Parliamentary decision (ie, retaining the blanket criminalisation of 
assisted suicide in the Suicide Act, as amended as recently as 2009!)27 
It is therefore impossible to identify a rationale for the CPS following the lead of 
respondents at some times but not at other times. Even when the principle adopted is clear – 
such as how great a role the suspect had – this principle might equally have been rejected. Two 
senior members of the CPS comment that ‘Of course, the public’s view, whilst persuasive, 
                                                          
26 CPS, Public Consultation exercise (Feb 2010) [4.7 and 4.8]. 
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cannot be determinative of any particular issue … without reference to other considerations.’28 
But they do not tell us what those other considerations were, or how they were balanced against 
the views of the public. Did the CPS look at how strongly expressed a view was? How widely 
held? How logical? How consistent with other principles? They argue that the consultation 
process was nonetheless vindicated because ‘The public gave its views and the Director has 
reflected the vast majority of them.’29 This quantitative approach is one of several ways in 
which the consultation failed to comply with the governmental consultation criteria operating 
at that time.30 And, while it is true that the final policy does in general reflect the majority of 
views, we have seen that it is not true in several respects, and that no convincing explanation 
was given about why some views were accepted and others not. 
Thus a 2-stage process was adopted, in which the second stage did not follow logically 
from the first. The DPP seems to have acted on the consultation responses that he liked, and 
not on others, for no clear reasons and with no guiding principle. The final policy is therefore 
as muddled as was the interim policy. We shall see that it is also cruel and restrictive of 
autonomy. This is because the consultation did not identify the fundamental principle that the 
policy was supposed to safeguard. If that principle was the protection of autonomy we would 
expect the policy to have two limbs: allowing ‘perpetrators’ to do whatever victims wish them 
to do, whether this involves a major part in the suicide or a minor part, whether done reluctantly 
or as part of a Dignitas-style organisation; and guarding against pressure on victims to commit 
suicide.31 Those who have something to gain from suicide are usually family. So the policy’s 
endorsement of family assistance and discouragement of professional assistance is perverse. 
Where was the evidence base for this choice? In the Netherlands assisted suicide requires 
medical endorsement.32 Is it plausible that what works best for people contemplating suicide is 
completely different in two ostensibly similar western democracies? 
                                                          
28 R Daw and A Solomon, ‘Assisted Suicide and Identifying the Public Interest in the Decision to Prosecute’ 
(2010) Crim LR 737, 743. 
29 ibid p748. 
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31 This is a great over-simplification of the nuances and controversies around the concept of autonomy. See, for 
example, S McLean, Autonomy, Consent and the Law (Routledge, 2010); C Foster, ‘Autonomy in the medico-
legal courtroom: A principle fit for purpose?’ Medical Law Review (2014) 22, 48. There are many critiques of, 
and warnings against, autonomy as an over-riding legal principle in general, such as M Shehan, ‘Deflating 
Autonomy’ in M Häyry and T Takala (eds), Scratching the Surface of Bioethics (Rodopi, 2003); C Foster, 
Choosing Life, Choosing Death: The Tyranny of Autonomy in Medical Ethics and Law (Oxford, Hart, 2009,) esp 
ch 11. See further discussion in section V. 
32 For examples of the many discussions of the Netherlands see Lewis, n 11; E Delbeke, ‘The Way Assisted 
Suicide Is Legalised: Balancing a Medical Framework against a Demedicalised Model’ (2011) 18 EJ Health Law 
149. 
If the CPS had started from these principles it would logically have had to consider 
whether VE should be included in its policy. It would then have had to have consulted 
accordingly. For the essence of VE is allowing ‘perpetrators’ to do whatever victims wish them 
to do, whether this involves a major part in a death or a minor part,   
Further what kind of public consultation should have been conducted? Unlike theft or 
drink-driving, laws that regulate AVD do not directly affect ‘the public’ as a whole. They 
mainly impact on people who suffer terminal, disabling or serious chronic ailments and those 
close to them. Yet no consultation was done with these particular groups of people, or indeed 
with the medical profession. Giving the general public a voice is appropriate. But giving the 
general public the only voice is surely irrational. It is also contrary to current government 
guidelines: ‘Consider the full range of people, business and voluntary bodies affected by the 
policy, and whether representative groups exist. Consider targeting specific groups if 
appropriate.’33 And the Northern Ireland government website, for example, states that 
‘consultation is … about making policies more effective by listening and taking onboard the 
views of the public and interested groups.’34 
If consultation exercises had been done with different groups of people their responses 
could have been compared. Even so, comparison cannot be done in a vacuum. Without explicit 
principles to underpin whatever would become the final policy, comparison would be 
worthless. 
 
III.  Second Core Value: Justice 
 
‘Justice’ can have many meanings, and there is no space in this paper to explore them all. I first 
look at whether, on balance, this policy leaves ‘victims’ better or worse off than a more 
permissive policy would leave them. I then examine the way in which ‘perpetrators’ are 
differentiated. 
 
Justice for Victims 
Since ‘victims of crime should be at the heart of the [criminal justice] system’,35 the CPS claims 
that ‘Championing justice and defending the rights of victims, fairly, firmly and effectively is 
                                                          
33 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/consultation-principles-guidance (2016). Visited 7 August 2017. 
34 https://www.nidirect.gov.uk/articles/public-consultations (my emphasis). 
35 Justice for All (Cm 5563, 2002), Forward. 
at the heart of all we do.’36 The effect of the final policy is that AS perpetrators are at risk of 
prosecution when they provide assistance in the following ways.  
Provide specialist advice: Anyone who offers organised assistance is likely to be 
prosecuted, as are health care professionals with a duty of care to the ‘victim’.37 Thus the policy 
is ‘designed to ensure that assistance in suicide remains an amateur activity carried out by 
inexperienced individuals without the assistance of professionals.’38 The result is botched 
suicides: failed attempts and deaths that are more painful and distressing than they need to be, 
such as the examples given in Part I(b) above. One of the most distressing examples is the first 
prosecution for AS carried out between the publication of the guidelines and the decision in 
Nicklinson. The perpetrator provided petrol and a lighter to a vulnerable man known to have 
suicidal intent, and who subsequently suffered severe burns as a result.39 Defenders of the 
policy may see this case as vindication of its restrictiveness, enabling prosecution of the 
irresponsible perpetrator. In reality it serves to condemn that policy, for if the victim had been 
able to secure better advice and assistance it is unlikely that he would have suffered so 
horrifically. 
Facilitate suicide in an organised way in the UK: Many UK citizens travel to 
Switzerland to die at Dignitas, generally assisted by friends and/or family who are never 
prosecuted.40 But it is likely that anyone organising a Dignitas-type process in the UK would 
be prosecuted.41 For example, a tip-off about a ‘euthanasia kit’ prompted police to raid and (it 
is reported) break down the door of an 82-year old wanting to end her life, causing her to delay 
– but not abandon – her suicide in 2016.42 This is obviously irrational. It is also cruel and unjust 
to most victims: 
 
                                                          
36 http://www.cps.gov.uk/victims_witnesses/index.html.  
37 Para 43, Factors 5, 6, 11, 12. 
38 Quoted by Patricia Hewitt HoC Hansard 10 March 2010, col 403 from P Lewis, ‘Out of Focus’ (2010) Solicitors 
J; 154(9):10-11, 11. For a lengthier and highly persuasive discussion see Lewis, n 11. This remains true even 
though health care professionals giving advice and assistance when not acting in their professional capacities are 
now (following an amendment to the Policy) treated like anyone else acting for compassionate reasons. See Para 
43, Factor 14. 
39 http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/latest_news/kevin_howe_convicted_of_assisted_attempted_suicide/.  
40 This is consistent with Para 45 Factors 1 and 2 if, as the CPS sees it, helping the ‘victim’ to travel to Dignitas 
is regarded as minor assistance. This seems to be an a priori principle. It cannot be reconciled with any kind of 
reality in relation to people who need assistance to travel to Switzerland. Note that neither Dignitas nor Dignitas-
style process and institutions are specifically mentioned in the CPS Policy, though under Para 43, Factor 16, 
prosecution is ‘more likely to be required if … the suspect was [in] … an organisation or group, a purpose of 
which is to provide a physical environment  … in which to allow another to commit suicide.’  
41 Factor 16. 
42 Guardian 22/4/2016. 
- It compounds the suffering of people who wish to die, and that of their friends and family, 
by requiring travel to a foreign country away from the comfort of one’s home and loved 
ones; 
- Travel to Switzerland will often be painful and difficult, particularly for people whose 
painful conditions are a precipitating factor in leading them to decide to end their life;  
- It costs around £8000 to use Dignitas.43 Travel costs, for the ‘victim’ and friends/family are 
extra. This is unaffordable for many people. 
 
This part of the policy also erodes the second limb of the autonomy principle identified in Part 
II. It puts pressure on some victims to die earlier than they otherwise would. People suffering 
degenerative illnesses, in particular, would be able to delay their death longer if they only had 
to travel to a ‘UK-dignitas’ than if they have to make the difficult journey to Switzerland. And 
who knows how many people, knowing that a ‘UK-dignitas’ would be available as a safety net, 
would not in fact take, or ask for help in taking, the final step? The implicit push to travel to 
Switzerland actually encourages AS.  
Provide substantial assistance:44 Three people were arrested in Loder’s case. It was 
decided there was insufficient evidence against one, and that it was not in public interest to 
prosecute the other two. One had only contributed to the deceased’s ‘preparations’ while the 
other had only had two phone conversations with her.45 This sends a clear signal to 
‘perpetrators’: do as little as possible to help victims see their final wishes fulfilled. This 
contributes to the number of botched suicides referred to above, pushes sufferers to 
Switzerland, and consigns many ‘victims’ to loneliness in their final and most distressing stages 
of life. If ‘victims’ want others to have major roles in their deaths, to make the final steps easier, 
why deny them their wishes? The logic of this argument then extends, of course, to VE: if the 
major role that someone wants another to have is to actually take that person’s life, there is no 
reason to deny it. A common objection to AS is precisely this: that it is a ‘slippery slope’ to 
VE and worse. ‘Slippery slope’ arguments have been comprehensively demolished by Smith 
and are briefly addressed later.46 
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Justice for Perpetrators 
Prosecution decisions should differentiate suspects who facilitate the autonomy of victims (by 
helping them carry out their freely made wishes) from those who subvert it (by persuading 
them to attempt suicide). Is that what this policy does? 
We have seen that it makes the provision of specialist advice hard to secure, leading to 
botched suicides. But surely detached medical professionals are less likely to persuade people 
to take their own lives than families and carers who may gain from these deaths. Further, in 
many suicide attempts made without specialist assistance the assister – unbearably distressed 
at seeing their loved one suffer the threefold hardship of their original problem, the decision to 
end their life and the failure to secure this objective - ends up being the actual killer. As we 
have seen, this ‘amateur’ VE is technically homicide and is prosecuted more frequently than 
AS. 
We have also seen that the amount of assistance influences prosecution decisions. It is 
not obvious that taking a greater role indicates more undermining of victim autonomy - more 
culpability - than where suspects avoid this responsibility. 
Take the part of the policy that makes prosecutions more likely when suspects do not 
seek to dissuade victims and/or do not act reluctantly.47 This is a random value judgement about 
culpability. Many suspects who are reluctant to help ‘victims’ would presumably consider the 
suicide of those ‘victims’ to be irrational (for if a proposed suicide were rational why would a 
‘perpetrator’ be reluctant to help a loved one?).48 But if victims and/or their suicides are 
considered irrational, surely helping those victims to die would be wrong, as treatment or 
persuasion might enable the victim to see sense. Yet people who reluctantly assist suicide are 
less likely to be prosecuted than those who do so with understanding and respect for their loved 
one’s wishes. 
Finally, the number of factors in the policy requires extensive police investigation to 
enable CPS to make a decision in accordance with it. Even though most suspects are not 
prosecuted, many are arrested, and in all cases investigations are intrusive. This all adds to the 
distress these loved ones have to endure – losses to their ‘freedom’,49 in other words. 
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IV.  Third Core Value: The Three ‘Es’ 
 
Every assisted suicide that is reported to the police is investigated by them, who then send a 
file to the CPS. Suspects are interviewed under caution and frequently following arrest. Yet 
hardly any are prosecuted: 
 
Table 1: Assisted Suicide Referred to the CPS by Police, April 2009-July 201750 
Withdrawn by police    28 
Not proceeded with by CPS    85 
Ongoing      8 
Referred for prosecution for other serious offences    7 
Prosecuted     2 
Not known (Included as CPS figures do not add up) 6 
Total Referred                136 
 
Nine possible prosecutions out of 136 cases is such a low percentage that the expenditure of 
resources – efficiency and economy - has to be a concern. But this is an inevitable consequence 
of post-death assessment. 
The effectiveness of the policy (the third ‘E’) is also questionable. First, the fulfilment 
of victims’ wishes is hampered by the co-focus on ‘the motivation of the suspect’. Botched and 
repeated suicide attempts are just the visible examples of this. There are doubtless many others 
who wish to end their lives but who do not; they continue to suffer because they have no access 
to expertise or help, or because they fear a lonely or botched attempt. 
Second, the proxies for assessing autonomy are ill-chosen. The policy rightly seeks to 
protect victims from those who might pressure them into suicide. But as we have seen, those 
most likely to exert such pressure are those with most to gain from a person’s suicide (such as 
family and close friends), and those least likely to exert such pressure are those with little or 
nothing to gain (such as professionals). Yet the policy facilitates AS by family and friends, and 
discourages AS by professionals. 
Third, we know that prohibiting activities that are desired by all parties to them does 
little to reduce them. What happens to such activities – such as drug taking, abortion, 
prostitution, gambling, American 1920s Prohibition – is that they go underground. The 
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activities are then more difficult to quantify and control. The ‘dark figure’ of both AS and 
euthanasia (voluntary and not voluntary), while impossible to estimate, is undoubtedly higher 
than if it were not a) criminal; and b) restricted more than an autonomy-based policy would be. 
Medical euthanasia, in particular, is rife. This is often done under the guise of ‘palliative 
care’ and ‘deep sedation’. It is usually justified, when called to account, by the doctrine of 
‘double effect’, which was made part of English law in Adams.51 This holds that where a 
medical intervention is done primarily to alleviate pain and suffering, there is no homicide even 
if the person administering it knows that death is a virtually certain consequence. Opponents 
of AS, as well as proponents, should be equally worried. Unlike ‘regular’ AS or VE, there is 
no automatic police investigation – in fact, there is usually no investigation at all, even when 
doctors announce that life-ending was their main motive.52 But nor is there any system of 
recording the patients’ wishes. We have to trust the medics that this was what the patient 
wanted and/or that death was imminent anyway. 
In a survey of end-of –life decisions, medical practitioners said that over 17% of deaths 
involved ‘double effect’ and over 16% involved continuous deep sedation (CDS).53 Mason and 
Laurie suggest that ‘... terminal sedation ... [is] ... likely to represent an instance of euthanasia 
hiding under emollient terminology.’54 Huxtable gives numerous examples where ‘double 
effect’ is abused – for example, a junior doctor claiming that the lives of elderly terminal 
patients are sometimes shortened to manage bed shortages. Ironically, it is now thought that Dr 
Adams was actually a mass murderer akin to Harold Shipman.55 And what are we to make of 
Howard Martin GP, who admitted hastening the death of dozens of his patients, some – but not 
all – at their request? He was tried for murder, acquitted, and then struck off.56 While mass 
murderers are hopefully few and far between, mass murder probably is not. Although 
estimating the ‘dark figure’ is impossible, is seems that it is far more extensive than most people 
– including, crucially, respondents to the CPS consultation – imagine. In 1999 it was estimated 
that up to 100,000 patients a year are quietly helped to die in the UK.57 In an Australian survey 
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of 683 surgeons, over one-third (247) stated that, when administering drugs to alleviate 
suffering, they administered more than necessary for this purpose but with the intention of 
hastening death. Moreover, it may be that the main difference between the 247 and the rest is 
their self-evaluation of their mental state.58 Magnusson also estimates that ‘a significant 
proportion of the medical profession has participated, illegally, in assisted death’ in Australia.59 
Similarly the 1996 BBC Scotland survey on medical AS showed that 12% of health care 
professionals personally knew another professional who had hastened death, while 4% said 
they did this themselves.60 In yet another example, a doctor in Hampshire was found guilty of 
serious professional misconduct by prescribing opiates and sedatives in ‘excessive, 
inappropriate and potentially hazardous’ ways. This is now the subject of a £13m inquiry into 
hundreds of deaths to which she may have contributed.61 
Most non-voluntary medical euthanasia is mercy-killing, but there are occasional 
bounty-hunters and pathological killers. Only rarely is it identified or investigated, and even 
more rarely prosecuted. The rare example of Howard Martin being prosecuted turned on its 
extreme facts; and also perhaps on him acting alone.62 His acquittal will have done nothing to 
encourage future prosecutions or deter medical killing without consent. 
Thus while no doubt many, probably most, of people who die as a consequence of 
‘double-effect’ do wish to die (or would, if they could express an opinion), there will doubtless 
be some who do not. The policy therefore lacks effectiveness because it fails to protect many 
of these people, failing to give effect to the second limb of the autonomy principle identified 
in Part II. As Orentlichter says ‘... terminal sedation is a method of death that is ethically 
inferior to assisted suicide.’63 Moreover, ‘double-effect’ is physician-oriented, not patient-
oriented: what matters is what the physician wanted/intended, not what the patient 
wants/intends.64 This runs directly counter to the victim-centred criminal justice policy 
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espoused by the CPS. Yet not only is a blind eye turned to cases of ‘double effect’ because 
medical professionals who assist suicide risk prosecution, it is positively encouraged even by 
those who oppose assisted suicide and who oppose the exercise of discretion.65 
 
V.  Towards a ‘Freedom-Based’ AVD Policy 
 
The Foundations of the Policy 
We have seen that the current policy is weak with respect to all three core values. Consequently 
the freedom of victims is unnecessarily constrained in several ways: many suicides are made 
unnecessarily distressing; many suicides take place away from family and friends; many 
assisted deaths are pushed underground, making voluntariness harder to assess. And the 
freedom of perpetrators is also unnecessarily constrained, putting many of those who genuinely 
seek to help carry out the wishes of victims at risk of prosecution, and subjecting them to 
intrusive investigations. It is true that there are very few prosecutions. But that does not mean 
that few perpetrators are at risk. For example, medical professionals who openly gave 
substantial assistance would probably be prosecuted, as would organisers of UK-Dignitas and 
people who sold DIY-suicide death kits. This policy bans initiatives like these that might make 
the final days of suicidal people easier. If any of the effects that the current policy leads to – 
starvation, exile to Dignitas, the agony of an overdose, the dismay and pain following a failed 
suicide attempt, clandestine killing on the pretext of ‘double effect’ - were forced on one person 
by another it would be criminal and/or a violation of Art 3 of the ECHR. It is surely ‘inhuman 
and degrading treatment’. This is what is forced onto countless numbers of people who are 
already suffering beyond endurance. 
What would a policy that conformed to the ‘freedom’ model and its core values look 
like? First, the consultation would be with the general public, the medical professions, and 
subsets of people with disabilities, chronic conditions and terminal illness. It would explain 
why the autonomy principle (with the two limbs identified in Part II) should be the basis of the 
policy. It would inform consultees of such facts about assisted death as are known or estimated 
under different kinds of legal regime. The consultation would seek views on the autonomy 
principle (and compare those of the sets of consultees) and consult on how to articulate that 
principle. It would consult on the key elements identified in this paper: how to best give effect 
to genuinely autonomous wishes to die; the (limited) ways in which the motivation of, and 
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degree of assistance given by, perpetrators are relevant; and how to protect people who may be 
at risk of being pressured into suicide. 
Second, we need to be realistic about ‘autonomy’. The idea that individuals have 
completely free choices, made in isolation from outside influences, is – like the free market – 
a myth. There is a spectrum of choice in all things, from complete freedom of choice to coercion 
masquerading as choice. In the middle of the spectrum lies the problem of people making 
choices that they would not make in other circumstances, including making choices that they 
think others want them to make (whether under pressure or not). ‘Autonomy’ is not exercised 
in a vacuum. 
Most people therefore make choices of their own free will but rarely in conditions of 
their own choosing. This is as true of people considering AVD as it is of people considering 
other choices in life. This is a structured matter, in AVD as elsewhere. George argues that the 
structural position of women in western society places more pressure on them to choose to die 
than it does on men: ‘For some women, assisted death might not demonstrate their autonomy, 
but their acquiescence to controlling influences.’66 We might note the similarly powerful, but 
different, impact of social class: wealth, for example, widens one’s choices greatly. But while 
we should acknowledge the inadequacy of all conceptions of individual autonomy, it follows 
that if it is inadequate to the task of driving policy about the types of life/death decisions 
discussed here, it is similarly inadequate to drive other equally important policies – for 
example, religious choice, education, and going to war. Like democracy, the concept of 
individual autonomy should be replaced by a better alternative, but as there is no better 
alternative we must make the best of it. That includes being vigilant about individual autonomy 
becoming overwhelmed by the influence of others, and doing what we can about the conditions 
that distort choice. We therefore need to create the system that best identifies and encourages 
non-lethal solutions for people who ask to die. 
Third, a change of policy will change the climate around AVD. Attitudes, followed by 
the law and practice, could slide down a slippery slope towards greater acceptance of suicide. 
This could increase social pressure on the weak, ill and vulnerable to end their lives 
prematurely. This will make the encouraging of non-lethal solutions all the more important. As 
Herring observes, ‘The central legal message we should be sending out to people wishing to 
commit suicide is ‘please don’t’.’ He rightly states that the law and public health system should 
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be aligned to offer ‘care, comfort and support’67 (ie, doing what we can about the conditions 
that distort choice). Thus the value of human life needs to be placed alongside that of autonomy 
as the foundation of a new policy. But this is as much a matter of the quality of life as its 
existence. Adequate palliative care is often unavailable, often ineffective and often 
inappropriate (eg where pain is not the problem).68 The principles of valuing human life and 
autonomy necessarily co-exist. For in a liberal society it is as impermissible to tell someone 
who wishes to die that s/he cannot, as it is to tell someone who does not want to die that s/he 
should do so (and it is even more impermissible to have laws that give effect, directly or 
indirectly, to such commands). The role of law is not to adjudicate between these principles 
but to ensure they both have space to operate in as unfettered a way as possible. Policy on AVD 
should therefore be a matter of both criminal justice and public health.69 
Keown argues that since autonomy amounts to a right to die and to be killed, this would 
be incompatible with the ‘right to life’ in Art 2 ECHR.70 But as Coggan observes, living and 
dying are not opposites. They are processes that co-exist: the process of dying arguably begins 
at the start of life, and certainly proceeds by middle age. People who demand control over the 
process by which they die are asserting control over how they live the final part of their life. 
Thus the argument of, for example, Greasley, that death is a denial of personal autonomy (since 
no choices exist to be made following death), and that therefore personal autonomy cannot 
provide a justification for the legalisation of AVD, is also flawed.71 
Further, there is no reason why one should not have the right to (apparently) opposite 
things. For example, ‘Having the right to consent to treatment does not render the right to refuse 
treatment as useless. Consenting to a sterilisation does not stand the Convention on its head, 
even though it can obviate the exercise of the right to found a family under Article 12.’72 So, 
those who are against allowing AVD because they fear the downgrading of certain lives should 
have no cause for concern, as long as it is regulated in ways that signal the value of everyone’s 
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life. The right to life of every person should be seen as underlined, not undermined, by a right 
to die.73 
Showing one policy to be less than wholly effective is of limited value unless one can 
show that another is or would be more effective. The ‘dark figure’ of illegal killing discussed 
earlier varies across different regimes. For example, a survey of 3,000 Australian doctors found 
non-voluntary euthanasia to be five times more common in Australia, where VE is illegal, than 
it is in the Netherlands, where it is legal. Further, Australian doctors were far less likely than 
their Dutch counterparts to discuss the decision to hasten a patient's death with the patient 
herself, or to seek her consent.74 Evaluations suggest that criminalising VE is less effective in 
controlling non-voluntary euthanasia than policies like that of the Netherlands.75 
If there is a danger of a permissive AVD regime creating a climate of active life-ending, 
there is an equally high risk of a restrictive AVD regime creating a climate of deception 
concerning the procuring and administering of drugs, the drugs paper trail, and post-mortem 
paperwork.76 In such a climate, not only is AVD tolerated among many health care 
professionals, but wrong-doing is far less likely to be discovered than in jurisdictions where 
AVD is allowed in regulated circumstances. So even in the Netherlands, there is deception: 
AVD by relatives is not permitted, but many doctors are aware of it, occasionally facilitate it, 
and often report such deaths as ‘natural’. The deception is not primarily a product of 
Netherlands’ permissiveness, but of the ban on relative-assisted dying.77 In the UK this is 
exacerbated by the cover for euthanasia provided by ‘double effect’. 
 
The need for pre-death regulation: A three stage approach 
A new pre-death system for regulating AVD is needed, whether operated by health care 
professionals, judicial figures, or another body. The sole criterion should be a voluntary, 
informed, clear and settled wish to die. But this is not the sole requirement. 
A pre-requisite – the first stage – would be better social and palliative care so that all 
realistic alternatives to death are explored and offered before people decide to take this final 
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step. Take Greasley’s objection to an autonomy-based policy. It would allow assisted dying for 
extreme examples such as teenagers who feel life is not worth living in the absence of their one 
true love. In Greasley’s opinion, the only way of controlling this is to interpose an objective 
valuation of that stated belief. In deciding that the teenager is unreasonable but others (people 
objectively suffering hugely such as Tony Nicklinson) are reasonable we are valuing some 
lives above those of others.78 This is why some disability-rights groups oppose the legalisation 
of AVD.79 However, if the only requirement is a voluntary, informed and settled expressed 
wish to die, no objective evaluation of the value of other peoples’ lives is needed. Nonetheless, 
the younger the person (and anyone under 18 would be subject to ‘best interests’ principles 
anyway) and the less objectively rational the wish, the less likely it is to be ‘informed and 
settled’. This would justify more extensive enquiry and a longer period of reflection than would 
be needed for, for example, the terminally ill. The issue is not that those lives are of different 
value but that those people are differentially able to settle on the most important decision of 
their lives. Ultimately, though, it eventually becomes each individual’s sole decision. That is 
why ‘compromise’ positions, relying as they do on an element of objective valuation of life,80 
are either incoherent or offensive. 
Greasley’s underlying concern here is with a ‘slippery slope’. Similarly, Ost observes 
that ‘a potential danger of loosening the medical criteria for assisted death is that it becomes 
harder to identify and maintain boundaries’.81 But boundaries to what prompts the wish to die 
cannot be constructed. Kay Gilderdale’s 31 year-old daughter, Lynn, was neither terminally ill 
nor as terribly immobilised as Daniel James or Tony Nicklinson. Yet Kay helped Lynn to die 
because Lynn’s suffering for nearly 20 years from ME led her to attempt suicide several 
times.82 Edward Downes, aged 85 and suffering from great pain, deafness and blindness, 
decided to die with his wife, who was terminally ill. He could have continued to live, but did 
not wish to.83 In the Netherlands a woman in her twenties, who had suffered sexual abuse from 
the age of five to 15, suffered so badly from post-traumatic-stress disorder (severe anorexia, 
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chronic depression and hallucinations) that doctors believed she could not be cured; 
consequently, she requested VE, which was granted.84 
There is no doubt that the wish to die of all these people was voluntary, informed and 
settled. Who are we to decide whether they were ‘right’, and – if we decide they were not – to 
deny their wishes? Even the most principled objectors to AVD, such as was Bishop Desmond 
Tutu, sometimes change their views when confronted with a painful and/or distressing decline 
in their quality of life.85 
Greasley’s argument illustrates another problem for those using ‘slippery slope’ 
arguments against legalising assisted dying. They work, if they work at all, both ways. Greasley 
says that ‘the law would not regard the assisted dying of a depressed, lovesick teenager as 
beyond recrimination ... because the teenager, though she might not know it, has everything to 
live for.’86 But if the reason for objecting to someone helping such a person to die is the 
objective fact that she has much to live for, it is not the assistance that is the problem. It is her 
wish to die that is the problem. If we think that people with objective reasons to live should not 
be helped to die then we should also think they should not be allowed to take their own lives. 
This argument against legalising AVD is a logical slippery slope leading to the re-
criminalisation of suicide. If we resist the logic of this ‘upward’ move we should equally resist 
the logic of the posited ‘downward’ move. 
The second stage would be the establishment of a pre-death regulatory system operated 
by people involved in social and medical care, and authorised accordingly. A ‘conscience 
clause’ would enable people to opt out of authorising AVD, allowing those seeking AVD to 
find someone who has no such concerns. This kind of transparent system would reduce both 
the abuse and the well-motivated but ‘dark’ practices currently carried out by relatives and 
medical professionals alike. The precise form of this system would be appropriate for public 
consultation on the lines set out in section II. 
The third stage concerns VE. The irony of the current AS policy is that, because of the 
way it de facto decriminalises much AS whilst maintaining the probability of prosecution of 
much other AS, it pushes many people into committing VE. So if the current restrictive policy 
towards AS is continued, a similar approach (de facto partial decriminalisation) should be 
adopted for VE. This logic would not necessarily apply if a new system following the two 
stages outlined above were adopted. If everyone who sought AVD were allowed AS, following 
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the kind of counselling and support described above, VE need only be sought in two 
circumstances: 
 
a) individuals who wish to die but not to kill themselves: one way of looking at this is to 
say that reluctance to carry out the final act indicates that the wish to die is not 
definitively settled. However, this is surely an empirical matter. Arguably, a 
requirement that the ‘victim’ carry out the final act would be a safeguard against abuse. 
But if such a system is flawed – and what systems are not? – people could still be 
pressured into AS. And while ‘autonomy’ undoubtedly requires that people be allowed 
to seek and find help to die, it does not necessarily require that people be allowed to kill 
others. These are finely balanced arguments. It is precisely in such circumstances that 
public consultation has a role, if done as set out in section II.  
 
b) Individuals who cannot kill themselves except by starvation: this is what Tony 
Nicklinson had to do to exercise his one last act of autonomy, a way of death in violation 
of Art 3 ECHR. In Nicklinson it was suggested that an eye-movement controlled 
machine that could administer lethal drugs would be a solution in such cases. It would 
not, of course, be a solution currently, as the supplier would undoubtedly be 
prosecuted.87 But the freedom-based approach advocated here would allow this 
solution. Until then, and until such machines can be made both effective and freely 
available, VE should be treated in the same way as AS for this category of people. Even 
then, there will remain arguments for VE as set out in a) above, on which there should 
be public consultation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Canada’s ban on AS was recently challenged in the Supreme Court of Canada. The court 
decided that this ban was contrary to Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It gave the 
government of Canada twelve months to draft a law allowing doctor-assisted suicide. It also 
recognised the link between AS and VE, deciding that a new AVD policy had to cover both.88 
                                                          
87 Remember, the police recently raided the home of someone planning to use a ‘euthanasia kit’ to end her 
own life: n 47. 
88 Carter v Canada [2015] 1 SCR 331. For discussion see, for example, B Chan and M Somerville, ‘Converting 
the ‘right to life’ to the ‘right to physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia’: an analysis of Carter v Canada’ 
Medical Law Review (2016) 143. 
In Nicklinson the UK Supreme Court viewed the UK’s AS policy as similarly 
incompatible with human rights. It warned that if Parliament does not deal with the problem, 
the courts may have to. Parliament did subsequently consider the issue but it rejected the 
Falconer Bill.89 This Bill was, in any event, deeply flawed: catering only for the terminally ill, 
it would not have helped either Mrs Purdy or Mr Nicklinson, and we have seen that any 
objective criterion for AVD is unacceptable. 
At least 12 different jurisdictions (counting 6 US States separately) now allow some 
forms of AS and/or VE. Two Australian States are currently legalising AVD, and 20 more US 
States are actively considering it.90 The South African judiciary is drifting in this direction.91 
The UK is becoming out of line with other democracies,92 so if a freedom-based approach to 
AVD were introduced this would be unexceptional. 
The current CPS policy is a sticking plaster that completely fails on all three core values 
of criminal justice. We have seen that it could be improved, but it will always fail badly. We 
have an ageing population, many members of which suffer medical problems that would have 
been terminal not long ago. Keeping people alive in difficult conditions is wonderful for those 
who wish to continue to live, but harrowing for those who do not. This problem will only 
increase. It is currently addressed by post-death assessment by non-medical institutions and by 
clandestine medical killing under the guise of palliative care. This is what happens when 
society turns a blind eye (such as Greasly commends to us) instead of confronting the problem 
head-on. Regulating AVD pre-death will not not a complete solution to our collective failure 
to tackle end-of-life problems. But it is a necessary part of it, and a great advance on the current 
approach. 
                                                          
89 Whether this now settles the matter, as far as judicial development of the law is concerned, is a matter of on-
going dispute in Conway (Guardian, 31 March 2017). 
90   For a good overview of developments in several jurisdictions, see J Downie, ‘Permitting voluntary euthanasia 
and assisted suicide: law reform pathways for common law jurisdictions’ (2016) QUT Law Review 16, 84; also 
see Guardian 20/9/2017 on the Bill in Victoria. 
91 D McQouid-Mason, ‘Stransham-Ford v. Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Others: Can active 
voluntary euthanasia and doctor-assisted suicide be legally justified?’ (2015) South African Journal of Bioethics 
and Law 8, 34. 
92 Conway [2017] EWHC 2447 (Admin) is the latest refusal to listen to those who seek help to die, in a 
judgement that put ‘sanctity of human life’ at its centre; and which, as an aside, denied the existence of non-
voluntary medical euthanasia that is evidenced in Section IV [para 124]. 
